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Existing institutions 1l11OCQting WQter in Odifomisl reflect prior appropriation 
WIller rights established whm water was abundant. These allOCJltion rules qutut 
users and do no! encourage water conservation. IncreJlSed WIller SCQrcity and 
gruwing valuation of ware,'s tmvironmental benefits are indUcing a transition to 
water allOCQtion mechanisms llull increase Waler efficiency in agriculture. 
Transferable rights systems wm lead to market-Wee water allocation, induce farmers 
to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from 
senior waler rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with 
transition from water rights to waler markets against the transaction costs 
associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading. 
Transition to water markets may preserw the agricultural sedor's well-being 
while Qllowing tk transfer of somt water outside of agriculture-in particular, 
for environmentill benefit. 'I'he cost of policitS proposed to mIua agricultural 
water supply whilt encouraging water trading a~ invtrstly ~lattd to tlu atent 
of trading aflowtd. 1hL mo~ farmers trade water, the less costly mIucing wattr 
supply is to agricultu~. Policies reducing water supply to Cmtral Valley P10jtd 
amtractors and allowing trading only amcmg tMst amtnzdors a~ much mo~ 
apmsivt than a~ policitS otClJunzging trading among all agricultural wattr u~rs 
in Ozlifomia. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing difficulty (and cost) of 
expanding water resources and increasing 
urban and environmental demand for 
water are inducing changes in California's 
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water policies. Agriculture accounts for 75 
percent of all water used in the state. 
Farmers use traditional irrigation technol· 
ogies and apply much of this water to 
lands with relatively low-value crops, 
such as pasture and alfalfa. The challenge 
is to design viable and effective reforms 
that will divert water from agriculture to 
alternative uses. 1his paper explains exist­
ing patterns of California water use and 
evaluates the alternative reform 
mechanisms' potential to divert water away 
from agricultural to nonagricultural uses. 
The paper describes California's exist­
ing water allocation mechanisms and de­
velops a theoretical argument identifying 
Abbftviation. 
CVP: CentRI Valley Pro;ect 
ET: Evapotranspiration 
SWP: State Water Prc;ect 
conditions under which transition to a 
market-like allocation system can improve 
social welfare and reduce agricultural 
water use without threatening agricultural 
viability. The potential for gains in effi­
ciency is much larger when all agricultural 
water users participate in the market ar­
rangement. Solutions advocating market­
like behavior for only some users have 
limited potential for economic gains. 
II.	 WATEA ALLOCATION MECHANISMS IN 
CAUFOANIA 
Water allocation mechanisms deter­
mine water price and distribution to indi­
vidual users. In California, a myriad of 
water allocation arrangements have 
evolved. The analysis here considers only 
the most prevalent arrangements pertain­
ing to surface water. Including groundwa­
ter considerations would complicate the 
analysis without affecting the conclusions. 
The most important point is that the exist­
ing system does not yield an allocation 
pattern that would be achieved through a 
competitive market. That is to say, 
California's water allocation rules do not 
produce a market-clearing price that 
equates supply with demand. Instead, the 
rules generally are based. on a M queuing" 
system that disallows the transfer or trad­
ing of water rights. 
In California, prior appropriation and, 
to a lesser extent, riparian rights doctrines 
determine rights to \'fater from" old" 
sources. These doctrines apply to most 
sources developed since the 19th century, 
except for state and federal water projects. 
According to Cuzon (1983), two rules 
characterize prior appropriation: "first 
come, first served" and "use it or lose it." 
Following the prior-appropriation queue, 
farmers receive water rights according to 
whm they start diverting water. Although 
policy prevents users from transferring 
(selling) water, it does not restrict the 
amount of water they divert and allows 
them to use as much waterlQ.S they can put 
to beneficial use. 
The riparian system in practice is an­
other queuing system but bases allocation 
on location. Growers located along a river 
or a stream can use as much water as they 
need to irrigate their fields, but they can­
not divert water away from the river. The 
riparian system initially appeared on the 
East Coast where the large number of riv­
ers made diverting water (ar from the 
river banks generally unnecessary. How­
ever, in the West, the relatively smaller 
number of rivers necessitates diverting 
much water with aqueducts. The West 
thus adopted the prior appropriation sys­
tem relying on historical rights as a guid­
ing principle. Burness and Quirk (1979) 
discuss advantages of efficiency gains as­
sociated with transition from a riparian 
rights to a prior appropriation system for 
water allocation based on a variation of 
the prior appropriation rules. Under the 
Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State 
Water Project (5WP), recipients of this 
water (·contractors·) receive contracts 
specifying the volume and price of water 
(or a specific time period up to 40 years. 
Contractors cannot trade water. In princi­
ple, the pricing of project water recaptures 
operating and capital investment costs. In 
practice, CVP water has been notoriously 
cheap. (However, since 1987 prices have 
increased. substantially. In 1992, Westlands 
Water District paid about $70 per acre 
foot.) Agricultural SWP users have junior 
rights relative to the Southern California 
metropolitan district. Agricultural users 
and CVP water contractors have junior 
rights relative to exchange contractors­
that is, individuals who have prior appro­
priation rights for bodies of water that 
were dammed and diverted as part of the 
CVP. 
Arguably, the existing water rights sys­
tem in the California Central Valley effec­
tively encouraged settlement and expan­
sion of the state's irrigated land base. 
Water allocation rules-particularly in the 
case of the prior appropriation doctrine­
are comparable to homesteading in en­
couraging settlement and land ownership. 
Allen (1991) demonstrates the economic 
rationale behind homesteading. One can 
use similar arguments to justify prior ap­
propriation rights. In the early stages of 
land settlement, prior appropriation rights 
enabled farmers to obtain water for a low 
price. Since the price was so low, farmers 
did not need to establish extensi.ve diver­
sion facilities and could invest in inputs 
other than water. 
Land markets replaced homesteading 
once the West was settled and new land 
became unavailable. To date, no compara· 
ble transition has occurred with regard to 
water resources. One reason is because 
California reached land constraints before 
water constraints, and until recently water 
was abundant. Additionally, differences in 
the nature of land and water make estab· 
lishing water markets more difficult. Land 
is a tangible commodity characterized by 
its fixity. On the other hand, water's criti­
cal characteristic is its flow, which can be 
volatile. This characteristic makes vesting 
rights difficult and also complicates estab­
lishing mechanisms that produce market­
like outcomes. Furthermore, increasing re­
turns to scale in providing and managing 
water conveyance systems may lead to 
water supply monopolies. This pOSSibility 
suggests that regulated utilities or other 
publicly controlled organizations should 
ensure that water pricing is efficient and 
competitive. 
Ill. THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION FROM
 
WATER RIGHTS TO WATER MARKETS
 
Most California water allocation mech­
anisms tend to queue users, to restrict 
water transfer and water trading, and to 
charge prices that do not adequately re­
flect the water's scarcity value. Shah and 
Zilberman (1992) develop a conceptual 
framework for analyzing the economics of 
transition from queuing systems to water 
markets. The framework is especially ap­
plicable to the prior appropriation system. 
The analysis relies on Caswell and 
Zilberman's (1986) and Dinar and 
Zilberman's (1991) irrigation choice mod­
els. These models assume that agricultural 
production has a constant return to scale. 
They concentrate on the choice of water 
and irrigation technology and assume that 
output is a function of effective water and 
irrigation technology. Effective water is 
water that the crop uses. Evapotranspira­
tion (ET) is a common measure of con­
sumptive water use. 
Effective water is a function of applied 
water and can be strongly influenced by 
irrigation technology, especially in areas 
where applied water losses due to deep 
percolation and runoff are more likely to 
occur. Modem irrigation technology (for 
example, drip and sprinkler) can improve 
the uniformity of water application and 
thus increase the efficient delivery of 
water to the plant's root zone, thereby in· 
creasing the proportion of effective water 
to applied water. Irrigation scheduling 
prevents overirrigation that may occur 
with simple gravitational technologies 
such as flood or furrow irrigation. The 
gains associated with modern irrigation 
technologies increase as environmental 
conditions become less favorable to tradi­
tional irrigation technologies. For exam­
ple, sandy soil or uneven land leads to 
substantial deep percolation or runoff 
losses. 
Figures 1 and 2 present results of the 
Caswell-Zilberman (CZ) model. Figure 1 
depicts the marginal productivity of the 
modem technology (MP"l) and of the tra­
ditional technology (MP1). Assume that 
the marginal productivities are decreasing 
and may be negative with excessive irri· 
gation (when applied water is greater than 
a'h under the traditional technology and 
aN under the modem technology.) Assume 
also that the modem technology produces 
the same (or slightly higher) maximum 
output per acre than does the traditional 
technology and requires less water to 
reach its maximum yield (aft <a'h). Thus, 
when applied water is smaller than at, the 
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water from the canal or stream to the field 
but does not pay for the water's scarcity 
value. Thus. one assumes water's mar­
ginal price to be zero (or close to it). There­
fore, profit-maximiZing farmers use water 
at a level where the value of marginal 
product of applied water is zero or very 
close to it. Figure 2 clearly reveals that 
under these circumstances farmers are 
likely to adopt the traditional technology 
and use water per acre equal to ali. 
Suppose that the region has a given 
amount of water, A, and the total amount 
of agricultural acres is A/alt. Under the 
traditional technology in the prior appro­
priation system, yield-maximizing water 
use per acre detennines irrigated acreage 
from a given source. Water planners and 
irrigation experts refer to a crop's "water 
requirement." This level corresponds to 
aJ, i.n figure 1. Obviously, the higher the 
water requirement, the lower the acreage 
that a given water source can irrigate. In 
the past, each time the water capacity for 
2 3 Water PriceW W 
a given source was exhausted, the govern­
ment or a group of farmers exploited an­
other water source and distributed the 
water among fanners according to crop 
water requirements. That procedure led to 
the water system seen in many regions, 
especially in the East San Joaquin Valley. 
Water markets establish a water price. 
Fanners apply water at a level so that the 
value of marginal product of applied 
water is equal to water price. If water price 
is positive, then water use per acre de­
clines relative to the prior appropriation 
system where water price is zero. Thus, 
introducing water markets should in­
crease the amount of land that a given vol­
ume of regional water can serve. The in­
troduction of a water market may expand 
irrigated land to include all fann land in 
the region. 
If only the traditional technology is 
available, water use per acre under the 
water market is equal to AIL (total 
waterI available land) and water price cor­
responds to point E in figure 2 (assuming 
that the price at E is the value of marginal 
product when water per acre is AIL). 
When more than one technology is avail­
able, different outcomes are possible. First, 
if the ratio AIL is relatively large and the 
resulting water price is smaller than wt in 
figure 2, then all farmers use the tradi­
tional technology. Alternatively, when 
water is scarce and AIL is relatively small 
so that water price is greater than w2 in 
figure 2, all farmers use the modem tech­
nology. A third possible outcome results 
when water price is between wt and w2 in 
figure 2. In this case, some farmers adopt 
the modem technology, and others adopt 
the traditional technology. The marginal 
physical product of applied water is iden­
tical in both firms and is equal to (wi p)2 
in figure 1. However, the traditional tech­
nology requires more water than does the 
modem technology. Obviously, using both 
technologies makes the quasi rent per acre 
(the difference between the revenue and 
water cost) equal under both technologies. 
Farmers use only the traditional tech­
nology under the market when the water 
per acre ratio is relatively high and water 
use per acre is relatively close to ali. The 
efficiency gain associated with moving 
from water rights to a market system re­
sults from being able to cultivate more 
land with a given amount of water. That 
is, moving water that has a relatively low 
marginal productivity on the land used 
under the prior appropriation system to 
land that has not be utilized before in­
creases water productivity on this new 
land. (Alternatively, some excess water 
can be moved from agriculture and used 
in other activities having high marginal 
productivities). Adopting modern tech­
nology enhances water productivity of 
water even further but entails higher in­
vestment costs. If extra acreage beyond 
what was settled under the prior appro­
priation system is minimal, the productiv­
ity gain associated with adopting the 
modern technology may be so insignifi­
cant that adoption is unlikely. If the water 
per acre ratio is relatively small, farmers 
likely will apply the modem technology 
on aU land. In this case, the water price is 
relatively high, a large increase in output 
occurs, and water use per acre drastically 
declines. A middle solution may occur 
when a water market increases the land base 
but the productivity gain is not sufficient to 
justify completely adopting the modem 
technology. In this case, fanners use the 
modem technology on some land and the 
traditional technology on other land consis­
tent with market-dearing rules. 
The analysis here suggests that transi­
tion from a water rights regime to a water 
market increases economic efficiency. This 
is true if the transition from one system to 
another does not entail adjustment costs. 
However, the prior appropriation system 
and the zero scarcity value of water it en­
tails permit establishing a very inexpen­
sive water conveyance system requiring 
little monitoring, especially if all land be­
longs to farmers who have water rights. 
Transition to a water market may require 
expanding conveyance systems, improv­
ing measuring and metering, and increas­
ing monitoring and protection of water 
flows. If the efficiency gain from operating 
the new system is smaller than the adjust­
ment costs of the transition, then the tran­
sition is not totally efficient. Indeed, lack 
of demand, low commodity prices, or a 
high initial water to land ratio may mean 
the amount of land that farmers optimally 
can utilize under a market is not much 
bigger than the amount they utilized 
under the prior appropriation system. In 
this case, the prior appropriation system 
is more efficient than a market, given tran­
sition costs. That may be why the system 
was established in the first place. Over 
time, as demand for commodities pro­
duced with water increases and their 
prices rise, or as adjustment costs improve 
due to better technology, water markets 
are likely to become more efficient, and 
one can justify transition. 
With transition to a water market, the 
farmer who had a right to water under 
prior appropriation now must purchase it, 
perhaps from a government agency. Obvi­
ously, the farmer loses therefore likely op~ 
poses the transition. Ameliorating the sit­
uation may involve introducing "transfer­
able rights," which allow farmers with se­
nior rights to sell excess water to farmers 
whose land is not included under the prior 
appropriation system. Farmers with prior 
appropriation rights now benefit from the 
transition and are less likely to oppose it. 
Of course, exceptions exist. For example, 
if the elasticity of demand for the com­
modities produced by farmers is low, se­
nior rights owners may object that the 
transition would expand production, re­
duce output prices, and reduce their in­
come. Realistically, that probably is not the 
case. Such objections seem unlikely if ad­
justment costs associated with transition 
to a market system are sufficiently low 
and farmers enjoying senior rights under 
the existing regime are confident that they 
will be able to retain these rights, transfer 
water, and gain income. The California 
Farm Bureau is not opposed to introduc­
ing institutions like transferable rights. 
Shah and Zilberman (1992) base their 
numerical example on parameters from 
the California cotton industry and assume 
that relatively light soils and uneven land 
characterize the geography. Table 1 shows 
some of their results along with parameter 
values. Four irrigation technologies are 
available: furrow, shortened runs, sprink­
ler, and drip. The first two may be rela­
tively inefficient-especially at locations 
with sandy soils and uneven land-and 
are traditional technologies. The latter two 
are modem technologies having higher ir­
rigation efficiency and higher set-up and 
other fixed costs (table 1). 
The example uses a hypothetical case of 
a region with 3 million acre feet (MAP) of 
water. Computer simulations obtain input 
use and output allocations for both prior 
appropriation and market mechanisms. 
Under the prior appropriation system, 
only 720,000 acres are utilized when out~ 
put price is $0.75/lb. This price and the 
corresponding queuing output serve as 
benchmark values around which demand 
elasticity varies from 1 to 50. If the adjust­
ment costs are relatively low ($5.00/ AF) 
and demand for cotton is elastic, transi­
tion to a water market permits utilizing 
the land in all cases, even when 1,100,000 
acres are available. However, as the 
water/land ratio becomes smaller, the 
dominant technology in the region be­
comes more advanced. For instance, 
when the region has 1,050,000 acres of 
land and the demand elasticity for cotton 
is 50, farmers use sprinkler irrigation 
throughout the region. In this case, tran­
sition increases the irrigated land base 
by about 46 percent and social welfare 
by about 24 percent. 
Demand elasticity is an important ele­
ment in this analysis. The higher the elas­
ticity, the greater the likelihood that farm­
ers utilize the more advanced technologies 
for a given amount of land, and the greater 
the benefit from transition to a wa ter mar~ 
ket system. Shah and Zilberman also show 
that even though adjustment costs are im­
portant from a conceptual standpoint, the 
level of costs that would make a transition 
to a water market system inefficient is sub­
stantial. 
Shah and Zilberman elaborate on the 
case with zero adjustment costs. In the hy­
pothetical example, if water availability to 
the region declines by 25 percent and a 
transition occurs from water rights to a 
water market, the farmers' well-being 
under the water market is the same as 
under the prior appropriation system. 
Thus, great potential exists for transfer­
ring nonagricultural water without reduc­
ing farmers' well-being if the transfer also 
involves transition to a water market. Ob­
viously, the higher the transition's adjust­
ment costs, the less water is available for 
transfer away from agriculture. 
TABLEt 
Tecllnology lnigation Efficiency Fixed Cost 
Furrow (l) 0.• 500
 
Shortened-Run (2) 0.7 517
 
Sprinkler (3) 0.8 548
 
Drip (4) 0.95 633
 
Land Base (10) acres) 900 900 10SO 10SO 
Demand Elasticity 1 SO 1 SO 
Queuing Outcomes 
Output (106 lbs.) 93. 93. 93. 93. 
Output Price (S/Ib.) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Irrigated Land (let acres) 720 720 720 720 
Market Outcom~ 
Adju51mmt Costs - $S/acrr 
Output (106 Ibs.) 1159 1161 1161 1344
 
Output Price ($/Ib.) o.sn 0.746 0.57 0.744
 
Waler Price (5/ AF) 62.0 73.75 63.7 118.4 
lITigated Land (lef acres) 900 900 902 10SO 
Technologies 2 2-3 2 3 
Percent Gain in Social Welfare 5.4$ 16.3% 5.4.~ 23.8% 
Shah and Zilberman abstract from 
many issues. They consider only three 
technological alternatives to traditional ir­
rigation-short run, sprinkler.. and drip­
ignoring the great potential for water sav­
ings and yield increases associated with, 
for example, irrigation scheduJing. They 
do not consider crop substitution as a re· 
sponse to a high water price. A transition 
away (rom water-consuming crops to 
other crops that bring higher profits per 
acre foot of water also deserves consider­
ation. Nevertheless, Shah and Zilberman 
establish the potential gain from moving to 
a market system that overcomes the ineffi­
ciency of a prior appropriation system. 
Moreover, for 25 percent of the irrigators 
who use surface water, the allocation does 
not exactly follow the prior appropriation 
system. Those irrigators receive water from 
the state and federal water projects and are, 
in effect, water project contractors. 
IV. WATER CONTRACTING 
Water contractors, like prior appropria· 
tors, cannot trade their water, but period­
ically can renegotiate their contracts. In 
principle, contract prices were designed to 
repay project costs. While SWP prices are 
high (sometimes reaching $80 per acre 
foot), historically the CVP water has been 
cheap and highly subsidized. Some who 
receive water from the federal water proj­
ect have been unable to receive all the 
water they want at the subsidized prices. 
Moore et al. (1992) document that the 
shadow price of water used by the con­
tractors, at least in the late 1980s, was 
much higher than the price paid. Thus, 
federal and state water project contractors' 
behavior renects the positive price of 
water. Therefore, their water application 
per acre is lower and their water e((jciency 
is higher than are those of the prior appro­
priators who, in many cases, experienced 
water prices dose to zero. 
Furthermore, water contractors' rights 
are junior to the prior appropriators' rights. 
Therefore, the contractors are further down 
the queue. Whenever a severe drought or 
water shortage occurs, the contractors' sup­
plies are more likely to be cut than are those 
of many farmers who are prior appropria· 
tors. For example, the 1990-1991 drought 
did not affect the supply of water to many 
prior appropriators while many contractors 
received. between 25 to 50 percent of their 
usual water allotment. 
Much evidence suggest's that water 
project contractors use water more effi­
ciently than do prior appropriators. For 
example, the State Water Resources Con­
trol Board shows that in 1989, CVP-con­
tracting cotton growers in the Westlands 
Water District used about 20 percent less 
water and gained about 20 percent more 
output than did the Valley growers who 
likely are prior appropriators. Mac­
Dougall et aI. (1992) find that fanners in 
the Broadview Water District use 20 per· 
cent less water for the same yields as do 
nearby fanners in the Central California 
Irrigation District. Differences in land 
quality or other fanning conditions in the 
two regions are small. Therefore, higher 
water price led to the water savings. Fur­
thermore, some of the water districts like 
Broadview have introduced tiered pricing 
to encourage fanners to adopt modem ir­
rigation technologies and conserve water. 
Indeed, the first farmers to use drip irri­
gation in cotton production were state or 
federal project contractors. Similarly, 
water-project water recipients are more 
likely to adopt irrigation scheduling and 
other water·saving managerial practices. 
Patterns of water transactions depend 
upon the participants in the water market. 
If trading is limited to agriculture, contrac­
tors will purchase water from prior appro­
priators. If the market includes urban sec­
tors, prior appropriators will be sellers, 
cities will be buyers, and contractors may 
be either buyers or sellers. If the environ­
ment is an autonomous player in the mar· 
ket with the capacity to purchase water, it 
also will be a water buyer. Understanding 
transaction patterns is especially impor· 
tant for analyzing the impact of new water 
quality regulations in California. 
V.	 WATER MARKETS THAT REDUCE COSTS OF 
MEETING WATER OUAUTY GOALS 
Concern for water quality in the San 
Francisco Bay and Delta is leading state 
and federal agencies to consider new 
water quality standards requiring diver­
sion of more water to environmental uses. 
Because environmental quality is a public 
good in the economic sense, the Mfree 
rider N problem is likely to cause un­
derprovision of private funds to purchase 
water for environmental purposes. There· 
fore, government intervention is needed. 
Current fiscal constraints prevent the gov· 
ernment from allocating funds to purchase 
water for environmental uses. Instead, the 
government has considered and enacted 
policies to divert some of the government· 
supplied water to environmental use. 
Government agencies also considered es­
tablishing new water quality standards re­
quiring more water diversion from agri­
cultural to environmental uses. 
The recently enacted Central Valley Im­
provement Act (Bradley-Miller Bill) man­
dates reallocating 800,000 AF of CVP 
water from agricultural contractors so as 
to improve San Francisco Bay and Delta 
water quality. Allowing water transfer be­
tween the CVP contractors (and thus es­
tablishing a water market) complements 
this reallocation. 
The act has the ingredients of a desir­
able reform. The efficiency gain associated 
with introducing markets will save some 
of the cost as with water supply reduction. 
This and similar proposals such as the de­
feated Johnston Bill calling for transfer of 
2.5 MAF from the contractors to environ­
mental uses are relatively easy to imple­
ment because state and federal govern­
ments supply the water to contractors. 
However, such proposals have limited po­
tential for improving welfare. Contractors 
are likely to use water more efficiently 
than do prior appropriators. Contractors 
consume less than 30 percent of California 
surface water. Therefore, efficiency gains 
from introdUcing a water market solely 
among contractors are limited. If water is 
to be taken away from contractors, effi­
cient reform must establish a water market 
that includes all agricultural users-con­
tractors and prior appropriators. Indeed, 
policies that significantly reduce water 
supplied to contractors will be very costly 
outside an agricultural water market. 
Zilberman et at (1993) use several ap­
proaches to estimate impacts on agricul­
tural income of reassigning water from 
CVP contractors to environmental uses 
while allOWing water trading between 
contractors. (Measuring impacts on eco­
nomic surplus may be more appropriate, 
but policymakers are interested in impacts 
on revenue and employment growth.) To 
find the upper bound on short term im­
pacts, Zilberman et al. consider that the 
response to water supply reduction will be 
fallOWing of land used with low-value 
crops. Figures 3, 4, and 5 depict revenues 
per acre foot as a function of the cumula­
tive volume of water applied in three re­
gions receiving water from the Central 
Valley Project. The Westlands Water Dis­
trict and the Friant-Kern region are south 
of the Delta, and the Tehama-Colusa is 
north of the Delta. The figures show great 
variability in revenues associated with 
water used on different crops in different 
regions. Water used with high-value tree 
crops generates more than $1,000 per acre 
foot, but water used with low-value crops 
such as pasture and alfalfa generates very 
low revenues. Regions south of the Delta 
regions tend to generate, higher revenues 
per acre than does Tehama-Colusa, whose 
return structure resembles those of many 
prior appropriators located in the north­
east Central Valley. 
The income reductions associated with 
reducing supply to CVP contractors is 
likely to be different if the reductions 
apply to all contractors or only to contrac­
tors south of the Delta. If the reform affects 
all contractors and allows trading between 
them, the 0.8 MAF reduction that the 
Bradley-Miller Bill calls for mostly will re­
duce acreage devoted to hay, irrigated pas­
ture, and rice, crops which generate less 
than $100/ AF. Restricting reductions to 
growers in Westlands and other nearby 
districts will reduce the coUon acreage 
that generates more than $250/AF in rev­
enues. Similarly, reducing 2.5 million AF 
of water among all Bureau contractors will 
reduce the fallowing of rice, sorghum, 
wheat, and hay acreage and some fallow­
ing of cotton. If the reduction applies only 
to contractors south of the Delta, most of 
the land for cotton will be fallowed as well 
as some land for almonds. Thus, extend­
ing the range of producers that the water 
supply reduction affects drastically re­
duces the economic implications. 
Zilberman et al. (1993) estimate that re­
ducing the water supply to CVP contrac­
tors by 0.8 MAF as suggested by the Brad· 
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ley-Miller Bill will reduce their revenues 
by $50-$120 and will lose 2,000 to 4,000 
man-years of employment annually. Fur­
thermore, reducing 2.5 MAF in agricul­
tural water supply to CVP water contrac­
tors would lead to an estimated annual 
revenue loss of between $400 million and 
$780 million and a loss of between 10,000 
to 19,000 man-years of work. The impacts 
would be much less significant if the water 
transfer occurs in conjunction with the in­
troduction and encouragement of water 
transfers between regions and with the de­
velopment of new conveyance facilities to 
ensure efficient water use across the state. 
Actually, transferring a substantial 
amount of water from agriculture to the 
environment in California, introducing 
transferrable rights, and creating an agri­
cultural water market may cause contrac­
tors to buy water and prior appropriators 
to adopt improved irrigation technologies 
and use less water more efficiently. Cali­
fornia agriculture uses about 20 MAP of 
surface water annually. The analysis here 
suggests that transferring 10 percent of 
this water from agriculture and introduc­
ing a water market (that is, allowing trans­
ferrable water rights) may not leave Cali­
fornia farmers worse off. Of course, such 
reform is complex and must address other 
issues, including managing groundwater 
and third-party effects as well as develop­
ing compensation mechanisms to ensure 
that none of the major parties in the state 
are big losers and that transition impacts 
are equitably divided. 
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